In absentia trials at the ICC? The Banda case re-awakens

 

After a long period of inactivity, the Banda case at the International Criminal Court (ICC) has suddenly come back to life, but for very controversial reasons that have received little attention and commentary.

One of the early cases at the ICC, charges against Banda and his co-accused, Jerbo, were confirmed in March 2011. The allegations relate to a deadly 2007 attack on peacekeepers in Darfur. Both suspects waived their right to be present at the confirmation hearing, and notably the facts underlying the charges were not contested by the Defence at that time. Much of 2012 and 2013 were taken up with delays over translation of evidence (that had to be audio-translated into Zaghawa, which is not a written language), attempts to stay the proceedings and the disclosure of evidence. Proceedings against Jerbo were later terminated following credible reports of his death, and trial was later scheduled to commence for Banda alone in May 2014, but this date was later vacated. Frustrated by Banda’s inability to voluntarily appear and Sudan’s lack of cooperation, the Trial Chamber decided to transform his summons into a warrant of arrest in September 2014.

 

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Photo: ICC

Since that time, Banda has remained at large and the case effectively dormant. Then, a few months ago, litigation in the case started to accelerate once again. In October, a re-configured Trial Chamber of Judges Prost, Fremr and Alapini-Gansou convened a status conference to discuss the status of the case, which was held entirely in closed session. However, in a subsequent Order, it was revealed that during the status conference, Judges Fremr and Alapini-Gansou “raised the issue of trials in absentia, with Judge Fremr raising the question as to whether such a proceeding was possible in this instance, in view of the developments in jurisprudence and amendments to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.” The Chamber invited the parties to file observations on trials in absentia in the specific circumstances of this case. Judge Prost dissented, noting that “the Rome Statute and settled jurisprudence make it clear that a trial in absentia is not possible before the Court in these circumstances.”

This was an extremely surprising move. Trials in absentia were expressly considered, and rejected, during the drafting negotiations of the Rome Statute. As noted by the Prosecution in their submissions, article 63(1) clearly provides “[t]he accused shall be present during the trial.” The amendments to the Rules – made by the ASP in the aftermath of contentious litigation in the Ruto case – allow only for temporary excusal from presence where the accused is subject to a summons (rule 134 bis & ter) or where they have extraordinary public duties (rule 134 quater), none of which are applicable to Banda.

It seems, therefore, there is no wiggle room for even a liberal interpretation of these rules in order to sanction an in absentia trial for Banda. Notably, the Ruto Trial Chamber considered that it had the inherent authority to proceed with a trial of an “absconding accused” who had previously voluntarily submitted to its jurisdiction (paras. 44-46), as to do otherwise would hold the Trial Chamber “hostage to impunity.” While a laudable proposition, this interpretation finds no literal support in the Statute or the Rules. The Appeals Chamber also reversed this decision, holding that a blanket excusal of presence was not permitted.

The Prosecution and Defence observations on in absentia trials were filed in December 2019. It is curious that over five months have passed since, and there has been no further action from the Trial Chamber. As of writing, the Defence position is not publicly known. Surprisingly, the Legal Representatives of Victims were seemingly unaware of these in absentia developments (despite the public order in November 2019), and only recently requested leave to make observations, a request which was granted by the Trial Chamber. Judge Prost again noted her dissent. This could indicate that a further judicial decision will be forthcoming.

A majority of the Trial Chamber clearly has an appetite for in absentia proceedings in the Banda case. It remains to be seen if they will decide to press ahead, and on what legal basis. Any such proceedings would likely be short-lived, however, as corrective intervention from the Appeals Chamber would surely follow.

 

Incitement, Hate Speech, and the Preventive Function of the International Criminal Court

Beyond The Hague welcomes the Peace and Justice Initiative and the University of Connecticut’s Human Rights Institute for this guest post, which proposes an amendment to the ICC’s Rome Statute to broaden the ambit of article 25(3)(e) to criminalize not only the incitement of genocide, but also crimes against humanity, war crimes and (potentially) the crime of aggression. 

In the lead-up to the annual meeting of the States Parties to the International Criminal Court in December 2017, it is imperative for states, NGOs and other interested parties to pay close attention to efforts to reinforce the Court’s preventive function by addressing incitement and hate speech. The criminalization of speech acts has become a major issue in recent times. With the rise of populism in the United States and the United Kingdom, questions have arisen as to the boundaries between lawful and unlawful speech. Some domestic authorities have undertaken to severely repress speech acts; which will inevitably result in litigation over the parameters of the right to freedom of expression.

The international courts are no strangers to these issues, having dealt with several cases concerning allegations of speech acts contributing to atrocity crimes. Given its potential global jurisdiction, the international criminal court can play a leading role in regulating hateful and inciting speech. Focussing on verbal acts before they escalate to physical violence will directly enhance the Court’s preventive function. Accordingly, the following proposal seeks to address the most serious forms of unlawful speech.

The Peace and Justice Initiative and the University of Connecticut Human Rights Institute have formulated an amendment of article 25(3)(e) of the Rome Statute, to read as follows:

Intentionally, directly, and publicly incites others to commit any of the crimes in the Statute, thereby substantially increasing the likelihood of their occurrence. For the purpose of this provision it is not necessary that the incited crime(s) be committed or attempted.

At present, article 25(3)(e) of the Rome Statute refers only to direct and public incitement of genocide. The proposed amendment would see a form of liability entered into the Rome Statute covering not only those persons who urge others to commit genocide, but also those who call for crimes against humanity, war crimes and (potentially) the crime of aggression.  It would remove the current anomaly whereby direct and public calls for crimes such as extermination, rape, or torture, for example, are not criminalized per se.

The proposed amendment would redress the current ambiguity in the formulation of direct and public incitement to genocide in the Rome Statute, which has created confusion as to whether it is an inchoate crime (as considered at the ad hoc Tribunals), or a mode of liability requiring genocide to actually occur, as indicated by its placement in article 25 and lack of wording to the contrary.

Importantly, the proposed amendment confirms the inchoate nature of this form of liability. This would strengthen the Court’s preventive function, as the direct and public incitement could be prosecuted without having to wait for the execution of the atrocity crime to commence. That contrasts with the Court’s more restricted jurisdiction over soliciting and inducing crimes under article 25(3)(b), for example, which require that the crime either occurs or is attempted (the latter meaning that the perpetrator commenced the execution of the crime, but was thwarted because of circumstances independent of the perpetrator’s intentions). Where direct and public calls are being made for atrocity crimes to occur, the international community should not have to wait, like an ambulance at the bottom of the cliff, for the violence to manifest before measures can be taken against those urging the crimes.

The proposed amendment makes it necessary to show that the incitement substantially increased the likelihood of genocide occurring. This filter is designed to exclude less serious speech acts, such as fanciful calls for crimes, or statements by persons with no real possibility of prompting anyone to commit grave crimes. As a formulation, “substantial likelihood” is well-known to international lawyers, thus benefitting from the guidance of settled case-law. For the avoidance of doubt, the proposed amendment explicitly states that the incitement must be done intentionally.

Several legal sources provide support for the direct and public incitement of atrocity crimes, including the ICCPR, article 20(1) (“Any propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law”) and (2) (“Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law”); the CERD, article 4 (“States Parties condemn all propaganda and all organizations which are based on ideas or theories of superiority of one race or group of persons of one colour or ethnic origin, or which attempt to justify or promote racial hatred and discrimination in any form, and undertake to adopt immediate and positive measures designed to eradicate all incitement to, or acts of, such discrimination and, to this end, with due regard to the principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the rights expressly set forth in article 5 of this Convention, inter alia: (a) Shall declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of violence or incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons of another colour or ethnic origin, and also the provision of any assistance to racist activities, including the financing thereof; (b) Shall declare illegal and prohibit organizations, and also organized and all other propaganda activities, which promote and incite racial discrimination, and shall recognize participation in such organizations or activities as an offence punishable by law; (c) Shall not permit public authorities or public institutions, national or local, to promote or incite racial discrimination.”); and the Genocide Convention, articles 3(c) (“The following acts shall be punishable (c) direct and public incitement to commit genocide”) and 5 (“The Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance with their respective Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the present Convention, and, in particular, to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III.”).

At a time when grave violence is prevalent, and the fires of discriminatory hatred are easily stoked, it is important to enhance the preventive function of international criminal law. Enacting the proposal set out above would be a measured but firm step towards realizing this potential.

Complementarity in the Cote d’Ivoire – Guest Post by Traoré Drissa

Editor’s Note: Beyond The Hague is delighted to publish this review (in French) of the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) Handbook on Complementarity by Traoré Drissa, a human rights lawyer in the Cote d’Ivoire who assesses the complementarity issues at play in his home country, and how the handbook can assist national structures. An English version is available here.

Note de la rédaction: Beyond The Hague est heureux de publier cette revue du Guide de la complémentarité préparer par le Centre international pour la justice transitionnelle (ICTJ). L’auteur est Traoré Drissa, avocat des droits de l’homme en Côte d’Ivoire, qui évalue les questions de complémentarité dans son pays, et comment le Guide peut aider les structures nationales.


Par Traoré Drissa, Avocat au Barreau d’Abidjan, Vice-Président de la Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l’Homme (FIDH)

Le renforcement des systèmes judiciaires nationaux constitue le gage de l’efficacité de la lutte contre l’impunité et de la prévention des crimes les plus graves. Cependant en raison de la défaillance des juridictions nationales, lors de conflits armés de grande ampleur, les Etas ont décidé de la création de la Cour Pénale Internationale (CPI).

Simone GbagboSimone Gbagbo at opening hearing of trial for crimes against humanity (photo: AFP)

L’ouvrage préparé et publié par le Centre International pour la Justice Transitionnelle (ICTJ) intitulé « Guide de la complémentarité » permet aux professionnels et aux moins avertis de pouvoir comprendre le fonctionnement de la CPI et surtout sa relation avec les juridictions nationales, dans le cadre cette lutte contre l’impunité.

Il permettra de faire tomber certaines barrières notamment l’accusation portée contre la CPI par une certaine opinion africaine qui la taxe d’être un instrument « néocolonial » ou de domination des peuples africains par l’occident. Le lecteur comprendra aisément que la CPI, organe international de lutte contre l’impunité ne peut trouver de compétence qu’en raison de la défaillance des juridictions nationales. En d’autres termes si les juridictions nationales font leur travail, la CPI ne pourra pas intervenir.

Expérimentation de Modes de Justice internationale : des tribunaux ad hoc à la CPI

L’on doit retenir que les situations de conflits internationaux et même de confits internes ou aujourd’hui asymétriques (terrorismes…) ont donné lieu à l’expérimentation de diverses méthodes de justice. Les Tribunaux ad ’hoc et spéciaux ont été mis en place. L’on est passé des  Tribunaux de NUREMBERG et de TOKYO après la deuxième guerre mondiale au Tribunal Pénal International (TPI) pour le RWANDA et celui pour l’ex-YOUGOSLAVIE ainsi que le Tribunal Spécial pour la Sierra-Léone et récemment les Chambres africaines extraordinaires  instituées par l’Union Africaine auprès de la Justice Sénégalaise pour juger l’ancien Président Tchadien Hissène Habré.

La particularité de ces juridictions ad ‘hoc était de connaitre d’infractions graves commises avant leur institution. Elles avaient une primauté sur les juridictions nationales pour les faits dont elles étaient saisies c’est–à-dire si une juridiction nationale se trouvait saisie simultanément avec l’une de ces juridictions ad ‘hoc selon leur sphère de compétence, la juridiction nationale devait se dessaisir à leur profit.

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Meaningful victim participation – but only if you can pay for it?

 

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Near Gulu, Uganda

 

On May 26th, the Single Judge of the Trial Chamber IX denied legal aid to 2/3 of victims participating in the Ongwen case – the ICC’s only case so far in relation to the Lord’s Resistance Army rebellion that for years terrorized communities in northern Uganda. The Single Judge’s decision does not come as a complete surprise: it affirms the interpretation of rules on financial  assistance for victims proposed by the Pre-Trial Chamber in November 2015, which I wrote about previously. In a broader perspective, it is not only a decision on legal aid, it is a step towards focusing victims’ representation with the ICC’s Office of Public Counsel for Victims (OPCV) and limiting victims’ procedural rights, specifically victims’ right to choose their legal representative.

Currently, a total of 2064 victims are admitted to participate in the trial, scheduled to begin in December. Why were 1434 of these victims denied legal aid? Have they failed to prove their indigence? Have their lawyers failed to meet the standards of quality and cost efficient representation?  No. The reasons underlying the Single Judge’s decision have nothing to do with the victims’ indigence or performance of their counsel. The 1434 victims were denied legal aid because they agreed to choose the same representative without engaging the Court’s assistance. Unlike the remaining 592 victims, who made no decision on their legal representation and for whom the Chamber appointed the ICC’s OPCV to act as a Common Legal Representative (CLR), these 1434 victims have fully exercised their freedom to choose a legal representative in accordance with the rules. Importantly, their choice has been approved by the Court as being without prejudice to the effectiveness of proceedings. This decision strikes a blow to meaningful victim participation, it is based on a mid-reading of the rules and is inconsistent with previous practice of the Court. Continue reading

Representation of victims in the Ongwen case

From Gulu to ICC_google maps

The Hague to Gulu, Uganda (photo: Google maps)

The confirmation of charges hearing in the case of Dominic Ongwen has begun. Many victims of the conflict in northern Uganda have been waiting for this moment for the past ten years. More than 2000 victims had been admitted to voice their views and concerns in the case brought by the Prosecutor against one of the top LRA commanders. How will they do that? Through their legal representatives standing in a court room in The Hague, 10,000 km north of where most of the participating victims reside.

Inclusion of victims in the ICC proceedings has been and continues to be one of the most hailed features of the Rome Statute system. There are many doubts, however, as to how it is being implemented. In light of the ongoing (never ending?) debate on “meaningful participation” of victims in ICC proceedings, it is worth looking at the recent developments in the Ongwen case regarding victims’ representation. The effectiveness of victims’ participation in the ICC proceedings depends largely on the performance of their counsel.

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Reparations and Assistance for Victims: Lessons from the ICC and Colombia

This post is based on my new paper in the International Journal of Transitional Justice’s forthcoming special issue, “Reconsidering Appropriate Responses to Victims of Conflict,” guest edited by Juan Mendez. Comments are welcomed!

In March 2015, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Court issued its first-ever judgment on reparations, in the Thomas Lubanga Dyilo case, confirming the Court’s historic commitment to moving beyond retributive justice for victims of the gravest crimes. At the same time, it urged the Court’s Trust Fund for Victims (TFV) to issue assistance measures to victims who fall outside the scope of victimization determined at trial [Reparations Judgment, para. 215]. The use of assistance to complement, fill in, or expand reparations programs is both novel and increasing in international law and transitional justice, yet there is little research focused specifically on their combination.

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A Peace March supported by the Colombian Victims’ Unit, which implements reparations and assistance for victims of the armed conflict. Source: Victims’ Unit

In my paper in the forthcoming special issue on victims in the International Journal of Transitional Justice, edited by Juan Mendez, I present two contemporary examples where reparations and assistance are being combined for victims of grave crimes: the ICC’s forthcoming reparations awards in the Democratic Republic of the Congo [see here and here] and Colombia’s recent reparations program – Law 1448 – for victims of its armed conflict.

The relationship between ‘reparations’ and ‘assistance’ exposes fundamental tensions at the heart of transitional justice: between inclusive and exclusive approaches to reparative justice; between the legal strictures of redress and the complex realities of violence; and, ultimately, between the supposed symbolic power of reparative justice and victims’ experience of reparations in practice. While scholars and practitioners often assume that reparations and assistance are clearly distinct, their combination suggests otherwise. Both the ICC and Colombian cases highlight that the line between reparations and assistance can become blurry in practice. They can look similar in form, have similar impacts, be distributed through similar processes and, I argue, impart similar notions of responsibility and recognition to victims of grave crimes and gross violations of human rights.

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Recent attacks show that Boko Haram remains far from broken, and is drawing closer to ISIS

By Alex Fielding, @alexpfielding

This article is cross-posted from the National Post. A “preliminary investigation” by the ICC Prosecutor into possible crimes against humanity and war crimes in Nigeria has been ongoing since 2010. The investigation is currently in the Phase III “Admissibility” stage, where the prosecutor is determining whether the Nigerian government’s proceedings “are substantially the same as those that would likely arise from an investigation” by her office and whether “those most responsible for the most serious crimes are being brought to justice.”

Boko Haram’s pledge of allegiance to the Islamic State on March 7 did not initially result in noticeable changes on the ground. Boko Haram’s recent targeting of moderate Muslim clerics, evangelical churches and perceived “non-believers” during Islam’s holy month of Ramadan, however, has made that pledge a reality.

Abubakr Shekau, leader of Boko Haram (photo: AFP)

Abubakr Shekau, leader of Boko Haram (photo: AFP)

Since the May 29 inauguration of President Muhammadu Buhari, a former military ruler who hails from Nigeria’s Muslim north, Nigeria, Chad and Cameroon have witnessed a significant resurgence of Boko Haram attacks. This comes after a series of territorial defeats in which Nigerian and Chadian-led regional counterinsurgency forces recaptured large swaths of territory in northeastern Nigeria from Boko Haram control.

Many of the attacks in recent weeks have been classic Boko Haram, marking a return to its militant roots with suicide bombings in urban markets and government buildings, as well as raids on villages across northeastern Nigeria. However, there have been two notable new developments that warrant special attention.

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Reparations in Ituri: A Long Awaited Judgment in the Lubanga Trial

Yesterday the Appeals Chamber (AC) of the International Criminal Court (ICC) delivered its judgment on the appeals against the Trial Chamber (TC)’s Decision Establishing the Principles and Procedures to be applied to Reparations (decision on reparations) in the case against Thomas Lubanga. This landmark ruling, together with the recent judgments in the Lubanga and Ngudjolo cases and the decision not to appeal the trial judgment in Katanga, are clear signs that the ICC is getting ready to deliver its first ever reparations. The unfolding of this reparative process in the Ituri district of the DRC highlights the challenges the ICC faces in trying to reconcile the notion of individual criminal responsibility with the mass scale of the crimes over which it holds jurisdiction. It further provides an acute illustration of the key tensions stemming from the fact that the ICC judicial process aims to be not merely punitive but also reparative.

Ituri District: Where forthcoming reparations will now seek to repair the harm from a war that happened over ten years ago

(For background on the Ituri war and trials, we’ve written extensively about the region, all of which you can find here.)

In its decision on reparations, the TC underlined the importance of reparations, both as a “well-established and basic human right” and as a reflection of the “need to go beyond the notion of punitive justice.” While noting that reparations oblige the convicted person to repair the harm he or she caused, the TC found that they could contribute more broadly to the communities that were affected and assist in promoting reconciliation. In yesterday’s judgment, the AC seems to have adopted the same approach.

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Has the Pre-Trial Chamber jeopardized the Gbagbo trial at the International Criminal Court?

Beyond The Hague welcomes Matthew Gillett for this guest post on the Gbagbo case at the ICC.  Matthew is currently a Legal Officer with the Office of the Prosecutor at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and was a member of the New Zealand delegation to the Review Conference of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2010. The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations, the New Zealand Government or Beyond The Hague. The author would like to thank Manuel Ventura for his insightful comments.

On 12 June 2014, Pre-Trial Chamber I (“PTC”) of the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) issued its conformation decision concerning the charges against the former President of Cote d’Ivoire – Laurent Gbagbo. Problematically, the majority decision of the PTC confirmed the charges for modes of liability under article 25 but declined to confirm the charges for superior responsibility under article 28. This outcome is difficult to reconcile with the PTC’s earlier findings in the confirmation decision. It results in the Trial Chamber receiving a proceeding that has been straight-jacketed into a mould that the facts may not ultimately fit. Indeed, Judge Van den Wyngaert in her dissenting opinion found that the facts were insufficient to satisfy article 25 even on the relatively permissive article 61(7) standard, but she would have confirmed under article 28 in part. In these circumstances, the spectre of regulation 55 re-characterization lurks in the background, along with its attendant potential prejudice to the integrity and efficiency of proceedings.

Laurent Gbagbo at the ICC, photo: Telegraph

Laurent Gbagbo at the ICC, photo: The Telegraph

Under the applicable standard set forth in article 61(7) of the Rome Statute, the PTC assessed whether it had been provided with sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe that Laurent Gbagbo was responsible for each of the crimes charged. The PTC confirmed the modes of liability ofco-perpetration under article 25(3)(a), ordering, soliciting or inducing under article 25(3)(b), and contributing to a group with a criminal purpose under article 25(3)(d), and committed the case for trial. However, it declined to confirm Gbagbo’s superior responsibility for the charges under article 28(a) or (b) despite the request of the Office of the Prosecutor (“OTP”) to do so.

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Assessing the right to liberty at the ICC with the interim release of Bemba’s lawyers

Beyond The Hague welcomes Maïté Van Regemorter for this guest post on the right to liberty at the ICC. Maïté is a PhD candidate at the Brussels School of International Studies, University of Kent. After working four years as a lawyer specialised in criminal law, migration law and international human rights law, she is currently working at the Belgian tribunal dealing with migration issues.

Until very recently, the ICC had never granted interim release to an accused against whom a warrant of arrest had been issued. Therefore, the ICC’s statements that ‘when dealing with the right to liberty, one should be mindful of the fundamental principle that deprivation of liberty should be an exception and not a rule’ and ‘pre-trial detention is not to be considered as pre-trial punishment and shall not be used for punitive purposes’ appeared to be rather theoretical. As a reminder, the right to liberty admits the possibility to detain someone who has allegedly committed an offence but requires it to be provided for by law and to be strictly necessary since the presumption is in favour of release. The respect of the right to liberty by the ICC could thus be questioned. Nevertheless, on 21 October 2014, Judge Cuno Tarfusser ordered the release of the four co-accused of Jean-Pierre Bemba in the case regarding the offences against the administration of justice. This ruling demonstrates the relevance of the right to liberty as such and of the ICC cooperation regime for the application of this right. In this post, I will endeavor to explain why.

Bemba, with his lawyers Kabongo (L) & Musamba (R), photo: ICC

Jean-Pierre Bemba (center), with his lawyers Kabongo (left) and Musamba (right), photo: ICC

ICC rules related to the right to liberty

The first thing to note is that no reference to the right to liberty is made in the ICC instruments. Nonetheless, there are several provisions with the issuance of an arrest warrant ordered by the ICC and the possibility of interim release before it, the main ones being respectively articles 58 and 60 of the ICC Statute. At any time after the initiation of an investigation, when the prosecutor identified a person who allegedly committed crimes within the jurisdiction of the court in a place where a situation was open, the prosecutor can apply to the Pre-Trial Chamber for the issuance of a warrant of arrest if the arrest appears necessary (i) To ensure the person’s appearance at trial; (ii) To ensure that the person does not obstruct or endanger the investigation or the court proceedings; or (iii) Where applicable, to prevent the person from continuing with the commission of that crime or a related crime which is within the jurisdiction of the Court and which arises out of the same circumstances. After his or her transfer to the ICC, the accused may apply for interim release before the Pre-Trial Chamber that will control whether these conditions are still met. After the first application for interim release, this control is done every 120 days until the beginning of the trial. After the start of the trial, this control ceases to be automatic but the accused may still spontaneously apply for such release. Article 60(4) of the ICC Statute, also provides that release may be granted in case of detention for an unreasonable period prior to trial due to inexcusable delay by the prosecutor.

The case regarding the offences against the administration of justice related to the Bemba case

On 20 November 2013, the ICC issued arrest warrants against Aimé Kilolo Musamba and Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, two lawyers of Jean-Pierre Bemba’s legal team, and of Fidèle Babala Wandu and Narcisse Arido, two of Bemba’s close friends because of their alleged criminal responsibility for several offences against the administration of justice. According to Judge Cuno Tarfusser, several factors justified their arrest: the gravity of the offences, the risk of flight demonstrated by their possibility to travel freely and to benefit from Bemba’s network and the risk for the administration of justice and of committing new offences demonstrated by the nature of the offences. The subsequent reviews of detention concluded to the persistence of these risks until 21 October 2014.

On this day, Judge Cuno Tarfusser ordered their release on the basis of article 60(4) of the ICC Statute, namely because of the unreasonable length of detention. He took into consideration ‘the advanced stage reached by these proceedings, the documentary nature of the relevant evidence and the fact that such evidence has by now been acquired in the record, all of which – contrary to what stated by the Prosecutor – also result in reducing the risks that these proceedings or the investigations might be obstructed or endangered, that the alleged crimes be continued or related offences be committed’. He concluded that ‘the reasonableness of the duration of the detention ha[d] to be balanced inter alia against the statutory penalties applicable to the offences at stake in these proceedings and that, accordingly, the further extension of the period of the pre-trial detention would result in making its duration disproportionate’. The Prosecutor appealed this decision but her request for suspensive effect was rejected by the Appeals Chamber.

Why would this decision demonstrate the relevance of the right to liberty for the ICC?

At first sight, the answer is not necessarily obvious since the decision of 21 October makes, unfortunately, no mention of this right. Nonetheless, by being the first decision ordering an interim release, this decision finally gives some practical content to the ICC’s statements related to the fact that deprivation of liberty should be an exception and not a rule.

Yet, it is interesting to note that Judge Cuno Tarfusser did not limit his decision to a strict application of article 60(4) of the ICC Statute, which provides that release may be granted in case of detention for an unreasonable period prior to trial due to inexcusable delay by the prosecutor. On the contrary, Judge Cuno Tarfusser applied article 60(4) in conformity with the right to liberty as recognised by international human rights law, which requires that an accused must be automatically released when his or her length of detention is unreasonable, without distinguishing who is responsible for the delay. Admittedly, Judge Cuno Tarfusser referred to the guarantees of a fair trial instead of the right to liberty when he noted that, ‘the fact that the duration of the detention of the Suspects’ is not due to the Prosecutor’s inexcusable delay does not relieve the Chamber of its “distinct and independent obligation… to ensure that a person is not detained for an unreasonable period prior to trial under article 60(4) of the Statute”, which obligation is a corollary of the fundamental right of an accused to a fair and expeditious trial’. Nevertheless, it is clear from the context of the decision that Judge Cuno Tarfusser was also concerned with the accused’s right to liberty.

It must be noted that, by adopting this ruling, Judge Cuno Tarfusser acted in conformity with article 21(3) of the ICC Statute, which expressly provides that ‘the application and interpretation of law pursuant to this article must be consistent with internationally recognized human rights’. While it is unfortunate that Judge Cuno Tarfusser failed to expressly mention either article 21(3) or the right to liberty in his decision, this ruling is important regarding to the relevance of this right for the ICC since, rather than limiting his decision to a strict application of the ICC Statute, he applied it in light of the requirements of the right to liberty.

Why would this decision of release prove the relevance of the ICC cooperation regime?

This ruling also demonstrates that the respect of the right to liberty could only be a reality before the ICC when the States Parties agree to cooperate with it. In fact, the previous reviews of detention demonstrate that, without the identification of a state willing and able to implement the release of an accused, such release is not possible and that, therefore, the respect of the right to liberty is impossible as well.

For example, during the first reviews of their detention, the four accused applied for release either in their country of origin, Belgium for Kilolo and DRC for Babala, or in the countries where they had a right to stay, the UK for Mangenda and France for Arido. According to Regulation 51, the observations of these states and of the host state were required in order to know their opinion regarding a potential interim release on their soil. At first, all of them refused. Belgium raised the lack of legal framework for the implementation of such release, while the DRC noted their inability to prevent the accused from committing new offences. On the other hand, France, the UK and the Netherlands signaled their opposition to accepting the accused without any further explanation. It must be noted that, in March 2014, Belgium and the ICC signed an agreement regarding, among others, a potential implementation of an interim release ordered by the ICC on the Belgian territory. The agreement as such is confidential but the Belgian law implementing it provides for practical elements such as the legal recognition of an interim release ordered by the ICC and the possibility to arrest the accused in case of the violation of the conditions provided for by the ICC. Nevertheless, as noted by the ICC, ‘the Agreement, far from witnessing to an unconditional availability and willingness on the part of the Kingdom of Belgium to accept that detainees from the Court be released on its territory or, even less, establishing an obligation on their part to do so, makes such acceptance explicitly conditional upon an assessment to be made “au cas-par-cas” on the basis of the specific appreciation that the Belgian authorities may make of a given case’. In fact, even after the conclusion of this agreement, Belgium continued to express their opposition to the release of the accused because, according to them, it would be easy for them to leave the country and because they could not legally monitor their communications. Judge Cuno Tarfusser agreed that, in the complete absence of a system of monitoring of communications and in the presence of the risk of interference with the administration of justice, ‘conditional release to the territory of Belgium is not only unwarranted, but also practically unfeasible’.

However, despite these initial oppositions of states, on 21 October 2014, Judge Cuno Tarfusser ordered the release of Kilolo to Belgium, of Mangenda to the UK, of Babala to the DRC and of Arido to France. Unfortunately, all the comments given by the states were confidential; therefore, it is not possible to know why these states changed their mind or whether Judge Cuno Tarfusser left them the choice to do so. Although unlikely, this latter option is possible. Indeed, since Judge Cuno Tarfusser only conditioned the release of the accused to the signature of a document stating their engagement to appear when summoned and to the indication of their address, he held that, ‘since no additional conditions [we]re imposed to the release, there [wa]s no need for the Chamber to further consult with the relevant States, whether in writing or by way of a hearing’. This statement might imply that Judge Cuno Tarfusser forced to some extent the states to accept. It must be mentioned that, if there is no explicit obligation in the ICC rules, to accept a provisionally released accused, Article 93(1)(l) of the ICC Statute stipulates that States Parties shall comply with requests by the Court to provide, in relation to investigations or prosecution, ‘any other type of assistance which is not prohibited by the law of the requested State, with a view to facilitating the investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court’. It could be argued that hosting a provisionally released accused would be part of ‘facilitating the investigation and prosecution of crimes’ and that article 21(3) of the ICC Statute requires an expansive interpretation in order to avoid potential human rights violations.

Consequently, this decision also illustrates the need of state cooperation to implement the right to liberty. This reliance is admitted by the ICC since it ‘exercises its functions and powers on the territories of States Parties and as such is dependent on State cooperation in relation to accepting a person who has been conditionally released as well as ensuring that the conditions imposed by the Court are enforced’. It further recognized that ‘without such cooperation, any decision of the Court granting conditional release would be ineffective’ ‘since it lacks the direct means to re-arrest a suspect/accused if he/she has absconded’. This need is also demonstrated by the present case. Indeed, on 22 October 2014, the Registry informed PTC II that the UK revoked the visa held by Mangenda with immediate effect. The UK justified this revocation ‘on the grounds that a change of circumstances since the entry of clearance was issued had removed the basis of his claim to be admitted to the United Kingdom’, without any further explanation. Therefore, despite the order of release, Mangenda is still in detention, waiting for a state willing and able to be found…